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I. Introduction 
We investigate behavior in laboratory asset mar- 
kets in which traders are sometimes informed of 
asset values. We test whether traders overreact 
to uninformative trades, mistakenly inferring in- 
formation from them. The existence of price 
"mirages," caused by such mistakes, might ex- 
plain why asset prices seem to be excessively 
volatile. 
A. Information Aggregation 
Empirical evidence that asset markets react 
swiftly and reliably to incorporate new informa- 
tion into prices is given an underpinning by theo- 
ries of "information aggregation" (see, e.g., 
Grossman 1976, 1981; Grossman and Stiglitz 
1980; and Jordan 1982). In these theories, traders 
have diverse information about the value of 
assets. If traders know how information affects 
prices, they can infer what information is causing 
observable price changes. Prices effectively re- 
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One explanation for the 
apparent volatility of 
asset prices is that peo- 
ple overreact to trades 
that are uninformative, 
creating self-generated 
information "mi- 
rages." We test 
whether mirages occur 
in experimental asset 
markets. There are in- 
siders in only half the 
periods, so traders can- 
not be sure if the 
trades of others reveal 
information. We ob- 
served four clear mi- 
ages in 47 periods 
without insiders. Mi- 
rages always occurred 
early in an experimen- 
tal session; in later pe- 
riods, traders learn 
whether there are in- 
siders by observing 
nonprice information 
such as the speed of 
trading, and mirages 
occurred only tempo- 
rarily. 
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veal the information, aggregating the diverse information of traders. 
In equilibrium, traders can learn nothing more from prices. Prices are 
said to fully reveal information if prices are those that would occur if 
traders pooled information openly. 
Because the temporal distribution of traders' private information is 
usually not known, testing information-aggregation models with natu- 
ral data is difficult. Joint hypothesis tests are possible if assumptions 
are made about the distribution of information (e.g., Schwert 1981; 
Huberman and Schwert 1985).1 However, if the joint hypothesis is 
rejected, one can always blame the assumption about information dis- 
tribution rather than the information aggregation model. 
Because one can control the temporal distribution of information in 
market experiments, they are well suited to testing predictions about 
information aggregation. In previous experiments, prices did reveal 
information in simple settings (Plott and Sunder 1982; Friedman, Har- 
rison, and Salmon 1984; cf. Ang and Schwarz 1985). In complex set- 
tings the results are mixed. Plott and Sunder (1988) and O'Brien and 
Srivastava (in press) found poor information aggregation. Forsythe and 
Lundholm (1990) and Camerer and Chernew (1987) found successful 
aggregation, and Copeland and Friedman (1987a) found mixed results. 
Successful information aggregation in complex settings seems to de- 
pend on traders having a common dividend structure and extensive 
experience (e.g., two or three experimental sessions), or on diverse 
information being distributed sequentially. 
B. Information Mirages 
In most previous experiments, uninformed traders knew with certainty 
that there were insiders. Their only mental challenge was inferring 
from price signals what insiders knew. In our sessions there are periods 
with no insiders; uninformed traders cannot be sure whether there are 
insiders or not in a particular period. Therefore, traders could falsely 
infer information from price signals when there are no insiders and 
prices do not convey information. Once one trader makes such an 
error, she may trade as if informed, causing other traders to infer 
mistakenly that she is an insider. We call the price path that results 
from these errors an information mirage because prices make traders 
see information which is not really there. 
Many tests suggest stock and bond prices are too volatile to be 
consistent with rational reaction to news (see Camerer 1989; LeRoy 
1. They test whether stock and bond prices respond to Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
announcements. Assuming that information on all the commodity prices in the CPI is 
known by consumers before the CPI is announced, stock and bond prices-which are 
affected by inflation (Fama 1981)-should not respond to the CPI announcement. They 
find that prices largely anticipate the announcement, but there is some market response 
when the announcement is made. 
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1989). The most well-known evidence of excessive volatility comes 
from the "variance bounds" tests of LeRoy and Porter (1981), Shiller 
(1981, 1986), and others, but those tests are controversial (e.g., Marsh 
and Merton 1986). Better tests (Campbell and Shiller 1987; Roll 1988; 
West 1988) also suggest excess volatility. 
Asset prices are also much more volatile when markets are open for 
trading than when markets are closed (Oldfield and Rogalski 1980; 
French and Roll 1986).2 For instance, the per-hour variance of returns 
on all New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Ex- 
change (AMEX) stocks during trading hours is about 70 times as large 
as the per-hour variance over weekends (French and Roll 1986). 
Trading-hour returns may be more volatile simply because more public 
or private information is generated during trading hours. Other evi- 
dence casts doubt on this appealing view.3 French and Roll thus con- 
sider the possibility that "self-generating" trading causes part of the 
volatility during trading hours (see also Black 1986): "Imagine that the 
market opens in the morning and, just by chance, the first ten orders 
are on the sell side. Other traders, who have no information about the 
asset except that the first ten orders were to sell, might draw the 
reasonable conclusion that something bad has happened to the com- 
pany. They might be induced to sell also and, if they are, the market 
price should fall. The price drop might attract the attention of other 
traders who extrapolate its recent path and sell, which attracts other 
traders who sell, and so on"(French and Roll 1984, p. 17). 
That is precisely what we mean by an information mirage. Grossman 
(1989) advances a similar explanation for the October 1987 stock mar- 
ket crash: "Ex-post, we label an event a 'panic' when a group of 
investors has shifted out of equities for noninformational reasons, and 
this shift has caused substantial numbers of other investors to shift out 
of equities because they think that the price has moved for informa- 
tional reasons" (Grossman 1989, pp. 7-8). 
Cornell and Shapiro (1989) describe an unusual 2-month period in 
which some U.S. Treasury bonds appeared to be mispriced relative to 
comparable issues. The best explanation of the mispricing is that the 
bond price rose because Japanese investors bought many of the bonds 
2. Price movements are not observed when markets are closed. But one can calculate 
an implied volatility by comparing the change from one day's closing price to the next 
day's opening price. 
3. The most convincing data are from weeks in 1968 when the exchanges were closed 
on Wednesdays due to a paperwork backlog. Assuming the same amounts of public and 
private information are generated on these closed Wednesdays as on Wednesdays that 
were open for trading, the return variances of weeks containing closed Wednesdays 
should be the same as those of weeks containing open Wednesdays. The actual variances 
from closed-Wednesday weeks are 82.1% as large as those from open-Wednesday 
weeks. This suggests that trading is self-generating, but the sample of closed Wednes- 
days is too small to be conclusive. However, Hertzel, Kendall, and Kretzmer (1990) 
report corroborating results from currency markets. 
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and squeezed American dealers, who had sold bonds short, when the 
dealers tried to buy back bonds to cover their short positions. But they 
also hint at a mirage-type explanation in their conclusion (p. 309). 
The anecdotal evidence is suggestive, but searching more thoroughly 
for mirages in natural data is problematic. Short-lived mirages will not 
be detectable if data are weekly or daily. Even tests with trade-by- 
trade data do not identify mirages clearly unless one knows whether 
traders are reacting to trades or to information. In our sessions, we 
can tell whether changes are mirages because we control the flow of 
information: if we observe prices changing dramatically when there is 
no new information, we know we have seen a mirage. 
II. Design of the Experiment 
Experimental design parameters are summarized in table 1. Sessions 
had either 12 or 9 subjects ("traders"), recruited through solicitations 
in classes and posted sign-up sheets. Traders were Wharton undergrad- 
uate students (sessions 1 and 5), New York University (NYU) evening 
MBA students (sessions 2-4), and Northwestern University MBA stu- 
dents (sessions 6-7). Only the traders in session 1 had experience in 
previous experiments. 
Traders were endowed with two assets at the beginning of each 
period and with 10,000 francs of working capital that was repaid at the 
end of the period. Traders could hold their assets or trade them for 
francs in a double-oral auction. At the end of the trading period, assets 
paid dividends to the traders who held them. After the dividends were 
paid, the assets expired. 
Traders belonged to one of three possible dividend types. There 
were four traders of each type (except in sessions 6-7, where there 
were three). Traders' types determined the amount of dividends the 
asset would pay them in each state. (The differences in dividends 
across traders are like differences in taxes, wealth, risk tastes, or li- 
quidity.) Traders knew their own dividends, but all they knew about 
others was that dividends may be different for different traders. 
A. Earnings 
All trading and earnings were in terms of francs, which were converted 
to dollars at the end of the session, at a rate of $.002 per franc. At the 
end of each trading period the state was announced, dividends were 
paid, and traders calculated their profits for the period. Profits were 
determined from summing dividend revenue and subtracting purchase 
prices. 
Traders could not sell more shares than they owned,4 and their net 
4. Otherwise, traders could collectively generate infinite surplus since different trad- 
ers have different dividends. 
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francs on hand could never be negative. At the end of the session, 
traders calculated their earnings and were paid in cash. Demand for 
assets is thus induced by demand for dollars (Smith 1976). 
B. State Information 
Except for a few "warm-up" periods (called state W), in which no 
state was determined, the state (G or B) was determined before trading 
began by a public drawing from a bingo cage, with replacement. A 
public drawing from a second bingo cage determined the number of 
insiders. The results of these draws were not announced until after the 
period was over. 
Before trading began, each trader was shown a private clue card, 
based on the results of the draws. The clue cards had either N (no 
information) or G or B, indicating which state had been drawn. Traders 
with informative clue cards (G or B) are insiders. Which traders, if 
any, were insiders each period was randomly predetermined and var- 
ied each period.5 
In sessions 1-5, there was a 50% chance in each period that all 
traders would get N cards (called state N), and there was a 50% chance 
that half the traders would get informative cards and half would get N 
cards. The number of insiders was always evenly distributed among 
dividend types. In sessions 6-7 there were equally likely to be zero, 
three, or six insiders. 
Subjects met in a classroom and were read instructions (which are 
virtually identical to those in Plott and Sunder (1982). After several 
practice draws from the bingo cage used to determine the state, the 
market experiment began. Sessions lasted for approximately 3 hours. 
Trading periods were 6 minutes long (4 minutes in sessions 4-5). 
The probabilities of the states and the number of insiders were com- 
mon knowledge. Traders did not know the dividend values of other 
traders or which traders, if any, had inside information. At the end of 
each period, the number of insiders and the state were announced. 
The market was organized as a double-oral auction: buyers shouted 
out bids to buy, and sellers shouted out offers to sell. Bids had to top 
outstanding bids, and offers had to undercut outstanding offers. A 
matching bid and offer was a trade, and a trade erased all previous 
bids and offers. Bids, offers, and trades were recorded on a transpar- 
ency, along with the identifying numbers of the traders, so traders had 
a perfect history of the period's previous market activity. No history 
of previous periods of trading was posted. 
5. We did not make the same traders insiders every period, as in some experiments 
(e.g., Plott and Sunder 1982), because insiders could then deduce whether there were 
any insiders from their own lack of information. Also Banks (1985) observed that infor- 
mation is fully revealed even when different subjects are insiders each period. 
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III. Competing Hypotheses about Prices and Allocations 
We distinguish two extreme hypotheses, RE and PI. 
RE. Traders supplement private information with the information 
of others from price signals. Since the inside information is perfect in 
the experiment, prices fully reveal information.6 
PI. Traders do not learn from price signals; they use only their 
private information about the state. 
It is hard to be formal about theories intermediate between RE and 
PI (though see Copeland and Friedman 1987a, 1987b, 1991), but we 
note one example. In Jordan's (1982) dynamic "temporary equilib- 
rium," traders make bids and offers based on private information be- 
fore observing price signals; then, as they observe price signals, they 
learn others' information and they converge to RE. Plott and Sunder 
(1982), Copeland and Friedman (1987a, 1987b), and others have no- 
ticed that actual trading in experiments does seem to follow a "Jordan 
path" of convergence to RE, both across and within periods.7 
Each trader's endowment of francs is large enough to buy virtually 
the entire market supply of assets, and the supply is fixed (by the initial 
endowment and the short-selling restriction). Thus, there is excess 
demand at any price less than the highest expected value; in competi- 
tive equilibrium, prices will be bid up to the highest expected value 
(or certainty equivalent, if risk neutrality is not assumed). Of course, 
there is no guarantee that competitive equilibrium will result because 
the double-oral auction is not Walrasian. But recent game-theoretic 
models (Friedman 1984; Wilson 1985) and hundreds of experiments 
with the double-oral auction (Smith 1982, pp. 944 ff.) suggest it does 
generally converge to competitive equilibrium. 
Hypotheses RE and PI make differing predictions about what the 
highest expected values, hence prices, will be (table 2), and about 
what types of traders will hold units at those prices (see table 3). The 
predictions of RE are straightforward: Prices will equal the highest 
expected dividend value of any trader, conditioned on the union of 
all traders' information. Traders with the highest expected dividend 
(conditioned on all information) will hold all units. 
6. Full revelation creates a well-known paradox: if traders can learn everything from 
prices, they have no incentive to invest in gathering information. To create such an 
incentive, prices must be "partially revealing" because of noise (Grossman and Stiglitz 
1980; Hellwig 1980; Diamond and Verrecchia 1981) or because profitable trades reveal 
the information in a non-Walrasian setting (Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik 1987) or 
when the informed trader is a monopolist (Kyle 1985). In our experiments, the paradox 
does not arise because information is costless to traders. 
7. Jordan's model does not strictly apply to experimental data because he assumes 
trades do not take place at temporary prices (Jordan 1982, pp. 246-47). However, a 
Jordan path will result if traders ignore capital gains or are myopic and regard each 
period as the last (Kobayashi 1977). 
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TABLE 2 Predicted Prices (in Francs) under Private Information (PI) and 
Rational Expectations (RE) Theories 
No Information Inside Information 
(State N) (State G) (State B) 
Session PI RE PI RE PI RE 
1-3 265 265 375 375 265 175 
4-5 265 265 375 375 265 175 
6 221 221 350 350 221 160 
7 210 210 375 375 210 175 
TABLE 3 Type of Trader Predicted to Hold Units by Each Theory, in Each State 
State 
Theory G B Nor W 
Sessions 1-3: 
RE Ii, Lu IIi, IIIu I, II 
PI Ii Iu, IIu I, II 
Sessions 4-7: 
RE Ii, lu IIli, IIIu I 
PI Ii lu I 
NOTE.-lu denotes uninformed type I traders, Ii denotes informed type I traders, etc. 
Hypothesis PI predicts that prices will be the highest expected divi- 
dend value, conditioned only on private information; traders with the 
highest expected dividend (conditioned on private information) will 
hold all units. 
A. Numerical Examples of Predictions 
The predictions are complicated. Examples from sessions 1-3 might 
help explain them. 
In states N and W there is no information, except the prior probabili- 
ties, about which state occurred. The highest expected value, 265,8 
will be the equilibrium price (assuming risk neutrality). 
In state G, type I traders have the highest valuation (375). Under 
PI, only informed type I traders (Ii) will hold units; uninformed type 
I traders (Iu) will think the assets are worth their expected value of 
265 and will sell them to type Ii traders. Under RE, however, unin- 
formed traders learn that the state is G, so RE predicts that both type 
Ii and lu traders will hold assets. Note that both theories predict a 
8. We assume the difference between 264 and 265 (.2 cents) is empirically mean- 
ingless. 
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price of 375, but they differ in their predictions of which traders will 
hold assets (RE predicts lu and Ii, PI predicts only Ii). 
We devised a novel test of predicted allocations.9 Table 4 illustrates 
our test for sessions 1-3. Suppose the state is G. Then RE predicts 
type Ii and lu traders will hold all units, and PI predicts only Ii traders 
will hold units. Since both the RE theory and the PI theory predict 
that type Ii traders will hold units, we call the Ii traders RE + P1 
traders. Since RE + PI traders are predicted by both theories to buy 
units, their behavior provides no evidence about whether RE or P1 is 
a superior theory (RE + PI behavior does provide evidence of how 
both theories predict in general). Since the only theory that predicts 
that type lu traders will buy units is the RE theory, we call type Iu 
traders RE-only traders. 
By defining the groups of traders this way, we can test the degree 
of rational expectations.'0 First we can ask whether RE-only traders 
are buyers or sellers, on average: do uninformed traders learn enough 
about the state to get on the correct side of the market and buy? 
Hypothesis RE predicts they will; PI predicts they will not. 
Then we can ask whether RE-only traders buy as much as RE + PI 
traders: do uninformed traders learn well enough to buy as much as 
informed traders? This is a more stringent test of RE. Prices might 
fully reveal the state even if uninformed RE-only traders do not have 
the time or insight to buy units. 
In B periods, the theories make completely different predictions. In 
sessions 1-3, P1 predicts that uninformed type Iu and IIu traders will 
never learn the state is B, so they will buy all the units at the unin- 
formed expected value price (265). Hypothesis RE predicts everyone 
will learn the state and type III traders will buy the units at a price of 
175. In our test, Type Iu and IIu traders are P1-only traders, type III 
traders are RE-only traders, and there are no RE + PI traders (i.e., 
no traders are predicted by both theories to buy). 
In N and W periods in sessions 1-3, both theories predict type I and 
II traders will buy units, so these traders are RE + P1 traders and 
there are no RE-only and P1-only traders. 
B. Predicted Prices and Allocations during Mirages 
In N periods, nobody is informed, but traders may not know that. (If 
one trader's clue card says N, she cannot be sure if all others' cards 
9. In most previous experiments (e.g., Plott and Sunder 1982), allocation predictions 
have been tested by counting the number of units held by traders predicted to hold 
them. For instance, in G periods one would count the number of units held by Ii traders 
(to test PI) and the number of units held by Ii and lu traders (to test RE). Such a 
comparison always favors RE over PI because the traders predicted by P1 to hold units 
are a subset of the traders predicted by RE to hold units. Our test eliminates this bias. 
10. The number of units these traders are predicted to buy or sell requires some 
calculation. These numbers are shown in an earlier draft of this article, available from 
us. 
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say N, too, or if half the other traders are informed.) Thus, it is possible 
for some trades away from the expected-value equilibrium to spark 
a mistaken belief by traders with N cards that other traders know 
something-a mirage. 
Mirages might drive prices to the G price (375 in our example ses- 
sions 1-3) or the B price (175). In a true G mirage, only type I traders 
will be holding assets because traders will have mistakenly inferred 
that the state was G, and type I traders have the highest expected 
value conditioned on that mistaken inference. Thus, if we observe high 
prices (near the G price of 375) but type I and type II traders are both 
holding assets, the high prices may not be due to a mirage. Similarly 
with B mirages: In a true B mirage, prices will be low and type Ills 
will hold units. If prices are below 265 (as they often are) but type Is 
and Ils hold, we can guess the low prices are due to risk aversion or 
something other than a mirage. Thus, we use both prices and alloca- 
tions to judge whether mirages occurred. 
IV. Results: RE versus PI 
First, we will compare the P1 model and the RE model. Most of these 
comparisons replicate earlier experiments with similar designs. (Read- 
ers interested only in the existence of mirages should skip ahead to 
Section V.) 
Several tests show that RE predicts better than P1, especially in 
later market periods when traders have some experience. 
A. Analysis of Prices 
Figures 1-7 show the time series of prices in each experimental ses- 
sion. Each point represents one trade. Two lines show the different 
prices predicted by PI and RE (in B periods). One line shows the 
common price prediction of PI and RE (in G, W, and N periods). The 
period number and state are shown at the bottom of each graph. 
Prices converge roughly to equilibrium levels, especially after trad- 
ers have some experience. In B periods with insiders, prices fall to the 
RE equilibrium level later in the session, but not early on. 
The accuracy of the theories can be measured by the mean squared 
error (MSE) of each theory's price predictions, summarized in table 
5. To measure convergence within each session, as subjects learn, the 
set of periods of each type was divided in half. The first half was called 
"early" and the second half was called "late." 
Table 5 shows that, when RE and P1 predict the same prices (in N 
and G periods), errors decline by almost half between early and late 
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periods. In B periods, RE errors get much smaller from early to late 
(36.0-13.7) while PI errors get larger (66.3-70.7).11 
In G periods, RE and PI predict the same price, so we distinguish 
the two with a novel profitability test. The test examines the trading 
behavior of uninformed type I traders (Iu) because RE predicts an Iu 
trader will buy units for 375 while PI predicts he will sell for 265. Using 
this difference in predictions, we can compare a trader's profit per 
trade under the two theories. For example, in sessions 1-3, if an lu 
trader sold a unit at 300, his profit under P1 would be 300 - 265, or 
35 francs. Under RE, his profit would be 300 - 375, or -75 francs. 
Similarly, if an Iu trader bought a unit at a price of 300 francs, his 
profit under PI would be 265 - 300, or - 35 francs, while under RE, 
profit would be 375 - 300, or 75 francs. 
The RE and P1 ways of calculating profits are similar to competing 
accounting schemes. The difference in the accounting schemes is how 
the assets are valued. We assume that traders are motivated to earn 
profits. It turns out that traders' profits are consistently negative when 
11. To measure convergence within a period, we counted the fraction of times that 
the MSE declined between the first and second halves of the period (Friedman, Harrison, 
and Salmon 1984). These fractions are given in the bottom of table 5. The hypothesis 
that within-period improvements in RE predictions are Bernoulli trials (with p = .5) is 
rejected in late periods. 
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accounted for in the PI way and positive when accounted for in the 
RE way. We conclude they are valuing assets using the RE value rather 
than the PI value (i.e., we suspect they have learned RE). 
B. Analysis of Trading Patterns 
Table 6 shows average net purchases per trader across groups of ses- 
sions with identical designs. (The types of traders predicted to buy by 
the RE and P1 theories are shown in table 4.) 
Trading data do not support convergence to RE as strikingly as the 
price data do. For instance, in G periods, the RE-only traders are net 
buyers (contrary to the P1 prediction that they will sell), but they buy 
only a unit or so while the RE + P1 traders buy about six units each. 
When the state is B, RE-only traders sell and P1-only traders buy in 
early periods-evidence for P1 over RE-but the pattern is reversed 
in late periods. An index of the degree of information aggregation 
indicates trading activity is roughly halfway between P1 and RE.12 
It is curious that prices indicate full information revelation while 
trading patterns indicate only partial revelation. Copeland and Fried- 
man (1987a) observed the same discrepancy. Perhaps uninformed 
(RE-only) traders learned the state too late in the period to make 
profitable trades. 
C. Analysis of Allocative Efficiency 
Since trading patterns do not strongly support RE, we now examine 
whether misallocation of units was costly in terms of traders' expected 
dividends. We do this by calculating allocative efficiency,"3 defined 
generally (Plott and Smith 1978) as the fraction of available surplus 
earned by traders. 
Call the total dividends earned according to each theory D(RE) and 
D(PI), call actual dividends D(actual),14 and call dividends earned if 
there is no trading D(NT). Our measure of allocative efficiency for RE 
is 
Eff(RE) = [D(actual) - D(NT)]I[D(RE) - D(NT)], 
and for P1 is 
Eff(PI) = [D(actual) - D(NT)]I[D(PI) - D(NT)]. 
12. The index takes the number of purchases by each trader minus the number pre- 
dicted by PI, divided by the difference between the number of units predicted by RE 
and PI. The index varies from zero (if PI is true) to one (if RE is true). In our data, the 
index ranges between .3 and .6. Experiments by others yield comparable results. 
13. Note that allocative efficiency is different from market efficiency, which measures 
the speed and reliability with which prices incorporate information. 
14. In N periods we used expected dividends instead of actual dividends. 
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These efficiencies will be zero if there is no trading, and one if trading 
is exactly as predicted by the theory. Negative efficiencies indicate 
trading in the opposite direction of that predicted by the theory. Note 
that since RE always predicts the largest possible dividends earnings, 
Eff(RE) is also a measure of overall allocative efficiency. 
Table 7 summarizes the mean efficiencies in early and late periods of 
all sessions. In N and G periods, where Eff(RE) = Eff(PI), efficiencies 
always improve from early to late and are quite high, between .75 and 
1.00. Even though RE-only traders are not buying as many units as 
RE predicts (as noted in the previous section), their failure to do so is 
not harming allocative efficiency much. 
In B periods, RE is worse than PI in early periods and much better 
than PI in late periods. 
In sum, we have compared the accuracy of RE and PI on prices, 
trading patterns, and allocative efficiencies. When P1 and RE agree, 
their predictions are generally accurate. When RE and P1 disagree, P1 
is accurate in early periods, but as traders gain experience, RE be- 
comes better. Specific results are remarkably close to those in other 
experiments. 15 
V. Results: Mirages 
The main purpose of our experiment is to test whether information 
mirages occur in a controlled setting. 
To identify mirages, we examined the holdings data and price path 
in each N period. Examining mirages that are apparent in hindsight 
may be fruitful, even if these mirages are rare and could not be forecast 
(by subjects or by us). 
We looked for mirages in N periods in which the maximum or mini- 
mum price deviated substantially from the expected-value price, and 
the holdings pattern was consistent with the pattern predicted in a G 
or B period. 
We call mirages "sustained" if trading activity (prices and holdings) 
resembled activity in insider periods throughout the mirage period, 
and "temporary" if activity resembled insider-period activity during 
only part of the period. 
Table 8 shows the four sustained mirages we observed in 47 N peri- 
ods, along with some descriptive statistics. (A table for temporary 
mirages is available from us.) Sustained mirages do occur, but they 
are not common. 
15. In their B periods, Plott and Sunder (1982) found that efficiency (TE) averaged 
46%, while in late periods ours averaged 41%. The mean squared errors of RE predic- 
tions were about 41 francs in our late G periods, and 14 francs in late B periods. The 
analogous errors in Friedman, Harrison, and Salmon's (1984) session 5 were about 4 
francs and 14 francs, but their periods were 15 minutes long. 
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For example, in mirage period 6 of session 2 the mean price was 363 
(the fully revealing G price was 375). The maximum price of 370 came 
between the second and third minutes of trading, after 29% of the 
trades in the period had been made.'6 Nineteen of the 24 units were 
held by type I traders (three different type I traders held units), and 
only two units by type Ils. Since the mean holding by type I traders 
was 11 units in nonmirage periods, and 22.7 units in G periods, the 
holdings pattern in the mirage period suggests type I traders believe 
the state is G. 
Note that there are mirages which resemble both states, G and B. 
The restriction against short selling, which might be thought to force 
prices upward and contribute to G mirages, cannot explain B mirages. 
The four sustained mirages always occurred in the first or second N 
period in a session and never occurred twice in a session. We think 
sustained mirages in these sessions are disequilibrium phenomena re- 
sulting from inexperience with N periods. 
It is useful to compare the price paths during sustained mirages with 
those in insider periods and in nonmirage N periods. The dotted line 
in figure 8 shows the time series of trade prices from one apparent 
mirage (period 5 of session 4), with the time of trades on the x-axis. 
Solid lines show the lower envelope of price paths in all G periods, 
and the upper envelope of B prices from the same session. 17 Unconnec- 
ted dots represent trades in nonmirage N periods of session 4. Note 
that most trades in N periods take place within the G and B envelopes. 
Subjects in session 4 could reasonably conclude that prices should 
be at least as high as the upper envelope (upper solid line) if the state 
was G and as low as the lower envelope (lower solid line) if the state 
was B. Bayesian subjects might then decide whether the state was G 
or B or N, based on whether the observed price path was above or 
below either boundary. Viewed this way, a mirage is simply an error 
(perhaps an unsystematic one) in Bayesian inference (cf. Aoki and 
Friedman 1986). 
The paths in figure 8 show how the mirage was sustained after it 
began. After the first minute of trading, prices moved into the range 
of high prices that were typical of G periods with insiders (the dotted 
line crossed the upper solid line). Subjects then guessed the state was 
G-prices had "revealed" it!-and began bidding even higher. By the 
16. Reaching a maximum in the middle of the period is evidence against a sustained 
mirage since prices usually rise or fall monotonically when insiders are present. How- 
ever, in period 6 of session 2, the drop from the maximum of 370 to the closing price of 
365 is small. 
17. To construct the G boundary, we plotted the price paths in all the G periods and 
took the lower bound at each point in time as the composite boundary. The B-period 
boundary is the same, except upper bounds were used (and we ignored period 7 in 
constructing fig. 8 because it was so unusual). 
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FIG. 8.-A sustained mirage price path (period 5, state N, in session 4). 
Unconnected points indicate time and price of trades in all N periods (except 
period 5) in session 4. 
second minute of trading, the mirage price path was well above the 
typical N-period prices (unconnected dots). Traders grew more and 
more confident that there were insiders who knew the state was G.18 
The dotted line in figure 9 shows the price path of a sustained mirage 
in period 8 of session 3. Between the second and third minutes, prices 
fell outside the usual range of N-period prices (unconnected points) 
into the range of B-period prices. Subjects then inferred, wrongly, that 
insiders knew the state was B and prices fell further. 
The trading that began these mirages is mysterious. Careful study 
of the bids, offers, and trades early in the mirage path did not reveal 
any stylized facts or patterns explaining why mirages begin in some 
periods but not in others. 
Since many mirages occurred in the first N period, a simple psycho- 
logical theory is that mirages are caused by traders overgeneralizing 
18. Note that mirage period 5 was the first N period in the session. Since traders had 
not yet seen the data from other N periods (unconnected dots), their Bayesian inference 
problem is especially difficult. 
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FIG. 9.-A sustained mirage price path (period 8, state N, in session 3). 
Unconnected points indicate time and price of trades in all N periods (except 
period 8) in session 3. 
from their limited experience in preceding periods with insiders. The 
price series in figure 3, for instance, show the possible influence of 
period 7 (a B period with insiders) on the mirage that occurred in 
period 8. The B information in period 7 was revealed in the last minute, 
by an uninterrupted series of offers plummeting from 310 to 100. In 
period 8 there was a similar series of offers between the second and 
the third minutes, from 350 to 200, which falsely signaled B informa- 
tion. The similarity (or "representativeness") of that price drop to the 
drop in the previous period may have caused traders to underweigh 
the prior probability (.2) that period 8 was a B period and overestimate 
the chance that it was a B period (Arrow 1982; Tversky and Kahneman 
1982; Camerer 1987, 1990). 
Indeed, every sustained mirage follows an earlier period with insid- 
ers with a similar price path,'9 which lends support to the representa- 
tiveness theory. 
19. See periods 5 and 6 in session 2, periods 4 and 5 in session 4, and periods 6 and 
8 in session 6. 
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A. The Role of Nonprice Information 
Sustained mirages never occurred in later periods. We conjecture that 
as traders get experience, they learn to distinguish insider and nonsider 
periods using nonprice information. One kind of nonprice information, 
nonverbal cues, has been ruled out by computerized experiments that 
yield similar patterns of information revelation; see DeJong et al. 
(1987). 
For instance, trading usually occurs more swiftly and with less pre- 
liminary bidding and offering when there are insiders. Since insiders 
are not monopolisits and the trading period is finite, their incentives 
are those of a Prisoner's Dilemma: Each wants to trade first because 
initial trades with uninformed traders are the most profitable but leak 
information (which makes later trades less profitable). Insiders will 
thus trade early in the period and with less time-consuming bidding 
and offering (relative to the amount of trading). 
Table 9 summarizes trading intensity-the number of bids and offers 
per trade-and the average number of trades in each time interval. It 
is easy to distinguish insider and noninsider periods using these data. 
When there are insiders, trading is less intense and more frequent early 
in the period (especially in the first half-minute). 
In the first half-minute trading intensity was usually greater than 10 
in N periods, and less than 10 in G or B periods. A trader who intuited 
this rule could count bids, offers, and trades and figure out whether 
there were insiders or not, thus preventing mirages. But for some 
reason, the rule does not work in sessions 2 and 4; in those sessions, 
more mirages occurred (two sustained and five temporary mirages in 
17 N periods).20 
In sessions 4-5 we tried to test the theory that nonprice information 
prevents mirages by reducing the length of periods from 6 minutes to 
4 minutes. We thought forcing traders to trade more quickly in all 
periods might harm their ability to distinguish between noninsider and 
insider periods and cause more mirages. The change worked in session 
4 (with NYU MBAs), but not in session 5 (with Wharton undergrad- 
uates). 
One can imagine other design changes to reduce useful nonprice 
information and cause mirages or enhance information and get rid of 
them. For example, a referee suggested inducing early trading in nonin- 
sider periods by paying subjects a commission for trading quickly. 
Would their frantic trading create mirages? 
von Borries and Friedman (1988) ran experiments in which only one 
20. In all other sessions there were two sustained and four temporary mirages in 
30 N periods. The difference in proportions of sustained or temporary mirages, 7/17 and 
6/30, has a z-statistic of 1.59 (p = .056) in a two-sample binomial test, normally ap- 
proximated. 
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trader was informed (insiders were monopolists). Since monopolists 
are not forced to trade quickly, more mirages should result: there were 
more mirages (and less information revelation) compared to a baseline 
session with several insiders. 
Sunder (1991) ran experiments in which subjects bought inside infor- 
mation so the number of insiders was endogenous. In periods with few 
active insiders, some mirages occurred. 
B. Temporary Mirages 
In many N periods, there were "temporary" mirages, in which the 
price path veered toward the G or B price, then corrected itself and 
ended near the uninformed expected value. We counted nine tempo- 
rary mirages in 47 periods.21 
A typical path for temporary mirages is a series of noisy trades away 
from the expected value, toward either the G or B price, followed by 
a peak (or bottom) in prices and movement back toward the expected 
value at the end of the period. 
A good example is period 17 of session 7 (see fig. 7). In this period, 
trader 7, a type I, bought units at escalating prices up to 350, then sold 
a unit at 325. The drop in price is an important signal: since insiders 
typically buy at monotonically increasing prices throughout a period 
(or sell at falling prices), a fall after a rise indicates the rise was uninfor- 
mative. Furthermore, if others recognized that trader 7 was selling a 
unit at 325 that he had bought earlier, his sale clearly marked him as 
a speculator rather than an insider who knew the state was G. That 
realization caused prices to fall further, almost to the expected value. 
VI. Conclusion 
There is much ongoing debate over whether stock prices are too vola- 
tile to be rational estimates of intrinsic value. Prices are also more 
volatile when markets are open than when they are closed. 
One explanation of excess volatility is that trading is "self- 
generating": in inferring information from the trades of others, traders 
sometimes err and their errors cause others to overreact, creating price 
paths that falsely reveal information that no one has. We call these 
information mirages. 
It is hard to know the distribution of information in natural settings 
and thus hard to know whether trading is self-generating. Therefore, 
21. Temporary mirages occurred in periods 7-9 (session 2), 9 (session 3), 10 and 15 
(session 4), and 14 and 17 (session 7). In many of these periods, prices were consistently 
away from the uninformed expected value, and did not veer back toward it. We consider 
them temporary mirages because the holdings data suggested that subjects did not end 
the period believing there was inside information, which is one criterion for a sustained 
mirage. 
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we tested for self-generating trading in experimental markets where 
we control the flow of information. 
In the sessions, subjects trade a 1-period asset that pays a state- 
dependent dividend. In some periods, some subjects have perfect in- 
side information about the state. In other periods there are no insiders. 
Uninformed subjects cannot be sure whether others are insiders or 
not. We can test whether uninformed traders learn the inside informa- 
tion when there are insiders and whether there are mirages in periods 
without insiders. 
In our seven sessions, uninformed traders did learn the information 
of insiders (as in most earlier experiments). 
In 47 periods without insiders, we observed four mirages that were 
sustained for an entire trading period; subjects traded, mistakenly, as 
if they had learned inside information from others. (We also counted 
nine temporary mirages, which started and ended within a trading pe- 
riod.) So mirages did occur, but they were not common. 
Our results are related to other theories and evidence. For instance, 
Copeland and Friedman (1991) hypothesize a process by which traders 
form price expectations based on market signals. When signals are 
imperfect (i.e., trading is "noisy"), traders can wrongly infer the true 
state. 
In experimental markets for long-lived assets, Smith, Suchanek, and 
Williams (1988) observed persistent departures from expected-value 
pricing ("bubbles"). They argue that while individual traders may 
know the intrinsic value of assets, if they are not sure that others 
know, then speculation may appear profitable (cf. Keynes [1936] 1964). 
Our mirages are caused by uncertainty about the information of others; 
bubbles seem to be caused by uncertainty about the rationality of 
others (or perhaps by irrationality). 
Others have studied models in which "noise traders" act irrationally 
and have asked whether rational traders can eliminate the noisy effects 
(DeLong et al. 1989; Cutler, Poterba, and Summers 1990). In our 
sessions, traders who spark mirages by trading away from the unin- 
formed (expected value) price act like noise traders. 
Sustained mirages always occurred in early trading periods of our 
sessions. These mirages can be thought of as errors in Bayesian infer- 
ence of information from prices. In early periods, traders have not yet 
learned the typical price paths in insider and noninsider periods. Noise 
trading then generates a price path that resembles the path in a previ- 
ous insider period, to which other traders overreact. 
But mirages did not occur very often in later periods because traders 
could identify the presence of insiders by the speed at which trading 
took place. Two facts support this conjecture: sustained mirages only 
occurred early in the sessions, before traders could gather enough data 
to distinguish between insider and noninsider periods by the pace of 
Information Mirages 491 
trading; and in the two sessions where the speed of trading was equal in 
insider and noninsider periods, there were substantially more mirages. 
Because traders can use the speed of trading to judge the existence 
of insiders, sustained mirages are unlikely to occur in experiments with 
experienced subjects. But temporary mirages often occurred late in 
the sessions; they could happen with experienced traders in natural 
markets, too, if noise traders made Bayesian inference difficult. 
The importance of nonprice information in limiting mirages suggests 
one policy implication. Financial economists have sometimes argued 
(e.g., Manne 1966) that restricting insider trading inhibits the ability 
of prices to incorporate information quickly. Our results add a new 
twist to this argument. Since restricting insider trading makes it less 
frequent or slower, restrictions inhibit the ability of uninformed traders 
to detect whether there are insiders or not. While reducing volatility 
when there are insiders, these restrictions may cause more mirages 
when there are not insiders (as in our sessions 2 and 4), which is 
certainly undesirable if prices are supposed to reflect information. 
References 
Ang, James S., and Schwarz, Thomas. 1985. Risk aversion and information structure: 
An experimental study of price variability in the securities markets. Journal of Fi- 
nance 40 (July): 825-44. 
Aoki, Masanao, and Friedman, Daniel. 1986. Asset price bubbles from poorly aggregated 
information-a parametric example. Economics Letters 21:49-52. 
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1982. Risk perception in psychology and economics. Economic In- 
quiry 20 (January): 1-9. 
Banks, Jeffrey S. 1985. Price-conveyed information versus observed insider behavior: 
A note on rational expectations convergence. Journal of Political Economy 93:807-15. 
Black, Fischer. 1986. Noise. Journal of Finance 41 (July): 529-43. 
Camerer, Colin F. 1987. Do biases in probability judgment matter in markets? Experi- 
mental evidence. American Economic Review 77 (December): 981-97. 
Camerer, Colin F. 1989. Bubbles and fads in asset prices. Journal of Economic Surveys 
3:3-41. 
Camerer, Colin F. 1990. Do markets correct biases in probability judgment? Evidence 
from market experiments. In L. Green and J. H. Kagel (eds.), Advances in Behavioral 
Economics, vol. 2. Norwood, N.J.: Ablex. 
Camerer, Colin F., and Chernew, Michael. 1987. Is trading self-generating? Experimen- 
tal evidence. Working paper. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, Department 
of Decision Sciences. 
Campbell, John Y., and Shiller, Robert. 1987. Cointegration and tests of present value 
models. Journal of Political Economy 95 (October): 1062-88. 
Copeland, Thomas, and Friedman, Daniel. 1987a. The effect of sequential information 
arrival on asset prices: An experimental study. Journal of Finance 42 (July): 763-97. 
Copeland, Thomas, and Friedman, Daniel. 1987b. The market value of information: 
Some experimental results. Working paper. Los Angeles: UCLA Graduate School of 
Management, January. 
Copeland, Thomas, and Friedman, Daniel. 1991. Partial revelation of information in 
experimental asset markets. Journal of Finance 46 (March): 265-95. 
Cornell, Bradford, and Shapiro, Alan C. 1989. The mispricing of U.S. treasury bonds: 
A case study. Review of Financial Studies 2:297-310. 
Cutler, David; Poterba, James; and Summers, Lawrence H. 1990. Speculative dynamics 
and the role of feedback traders. American Economic Review 80 (May): 63-68. 
492 Journal of Business 
DeJong, Douglas V.; Forsythe, Robert; Lundholm, Russell L.; and Watts, Susan G. 
1987. Do prices convey information? Futher experimental evidence. Working paper 
no. 87-10. Iowa City: University of Iowa, Department of Economics, May. 
DeLong, J. Bradford; Shleifer, Andrei; Summers, Lawrence H.; and Waldmann, Robert 
J. 1989. The size and incidence of the losses from noise trading. Journal of Finance 
44 (July): 681-96. 
Diamond, Douglas W., and Verrecchia, Robert E. 1981. Information aggregation in a 
noisy rational expectations economy. Journal of Financial Economics 9 (September): 
221-35. 
Dubey, Pradeep; Geanakoplos, John; and Shubik, Martin. 1987. The revelation of infor- 
mation in strategic market games: A critique of rational expectations equilibrium. 
Journal of Mathematical Economics 16:105-37. 
Fama, Eugene F. 1981. Stock returns, real activity, inflation and money. American 
Economic Review 71 (September): 545-65. 
Forsythe, Robert, and Lundholm, Russell. 1990. Information aggregation in an experi- 
mental market. Econometrica 58 (March): 309-47. 
French, Kenneth R., and Roll, Richard. 1984. Is trading self-generating? Working Paper 
no. 121. Chicago: University of Chicago Center for Research in Security Prices, Feb- 
ruary. 
French, Kenneth R., and Roll, Richard. 1986. Stock return variances: The arrival of 
information and the reaction of traders. Journal of Financial Economics 17 (Septem- 
ber): 5-26. 
Friedman, Daniel. 1984. On the efficiency of experimental double auction markets. 
American Economic Review 74:60-72. 
Friedman, Daniel; Harrison, Glenn; and Salmon, Jon. 1984. The informational efficiency 
of experimental markets. Journal of Political Economy 92 (June): 349-408. 
Grossman, Sanford J. 1976. On the efficiency of competitive stock markets where traders 
have diverse information. Journal of Finance 31:573-85. 
Grossman, Sanford J. 1981. An introduction to the theory of rational expectations under 
asymmetric information. Review of Economic Studies 48:541-59. 
Grossman, Stanford J. 1989. The Informational Role of Prices. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press. 
Grossman, Sanford J., and Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1980. On the impossibility of informa- 
tionally efficient markets. American Economic Review 70:393-408. 
Hellwig, Martin. 1980. On the aggregation of information in capital markets. Journal of 
Economic Theory 22:477-98. 
Hertzel, Michael G.; Kendall, Coleman S.; and Kretzmer, Peter E. 1990. The volatility 
of asset returns during trading and nontrading hours: Some evidence from the foreign 
exchange markets. Journal of International Money and Finance 9:335-43. 
Huberman, Gur, and Schwert, G. William. 1985. Information aggregation, inflation, and 
the pricing of indexed bonds. Journal of Political Economy 93:92-114. 
Jordan, James S. 1982. A dynamic model of expectations equilibrium. Journal of Eco- 
nomic Theory 26 (April): 235-54. 
Keynes, John Maynard. [1936] 1964. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and 
Money. London: Harcourt Brace. 
Kobayashi, T. 1977. A convergence theorem on rational expectations equilibrium with 
price information. Institute for Mathematical Studies of Social Sciences Working Pa- 
per no. 79. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University, January. 
Kyle, Albert F. 1985. Continuous auctions with insider trading. Econometrica 53 (No- 
vember): 1315-33. 
LeRoy, Stephen F. 1989. Efficient capital markets and martingales. Journal of Economic 
Literature 27 (December): 1583-1621. 
LeRoy, Stephen F., and Porter, Richard D. 1981. The present-value relation: Tests 
based on implied variance bounds. Econometrica 49 (May): 555-74. 
Manne, Henry G. 1966. Insider Trading and the Stock Market. New York: Free Press. 
Marsh, Terry A., and Merton, Robert C. 1986. Dividend variability and variance bounds 
test for rationality of stock market prices. American Economic Review 76 (June): 
483-98. 
O'Brien, John, and Srivastava, Sanjay. In press. Dynamic stock markets with multiple 
assets: An experimental analysis. Journal of Finance. 
Information Mirages 493 
Oldfield, George S., and Rogalski, Richard J. 1980. A theory of common stock returns 
over trading and non-trading periods. Journal of Finance 35 (June): 729-51. 
Plott, Charles R., and Smith, Vernon L. 1978. An experimental examination of two 
exchange institutions. Review of Economic Studies 45 (February): 133-53. 
Plott, Charles R., and Sunder, Shyam. 1982. Efficiency of experimental security markets 
with insider information: An application of rational expectations models. Journal of 
Political Economy 90 (August): 663-98. 
Plott, Charles R., and Sunder, Shyam. 1988. Rational expectations and aggregation of 
diverse information in laboratory security markets. Econometrica 56 (September): 
1085-1118. 
Roll, Richard. 1988. R2. Journal of Finance 43 (July): 541-66. 
Schwert, G. William. 1981. The adjustment of stock prices to new information about 
inflation. Journal of Finance 36:15-30. 
Shiller, Robert. 1981. Do stock prices move too much to be justified by subsequent 
changes in dividends? American Economic Review 71 (June): 421-36. 
Shiller, Robert. 1986. The Marsh-Merton model of managers' smoothing of dividends. 
American Economic Review 76 (June): 499-503. 
Smith, Vernon L. 1976. Experimental economics: Induced value theory. American Eco- 
nomic Review 66:274-79. 
Smith, Vernon L. 1982. Microeconomic systems as an experimental science. American 
Economic Review 72 (December): 923-55. 
Smith, Vernon L.; Suchanek, Gerry L.; and Williams, Arlington W. 1988. Bubbles, 
crashes, and endogenous expectations in experimental spot asset markets. Economet- 
rica 56 (September): 1119-51. 
Sunder, Shyam. 1991. Market for information: Experimental evidence. Working paper. 
Pittsburgh: Carnegie Mellon University, Graduate School of Industrial Adminsi- 
tration. 
Tversky, Amos, and Kahneman, Daniel. 1982. Judgments of and by representativeness. 
In P. Slovic, A. Tversky, and D. Kahneman (eds.), Judgment under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
von Borries, Alexander, and Friedman, Daniel. 1988. Monopolist insiders in computer- 
ized asset markets: A note on some experimental results. Organized Research Activity 
in Applied Economics Working Paper no. 178. Santa Cruz: University of California. 
West, Kenneth. 1988. Bubbles, fads and stock price volatility tests: A partial evaluation. 
Journal of Finance 43 (July): 639-55. 
Wilson, Robert. 1985. Incentive efficiency of double auctions. Econometrica 53 (Septem- 
ber): 1101-15. 
